Fac-360
Companies

The API credentials of this company

Any member may read it, VIEWER included. It carries no secret -- there is no column holding one -- and the public prefix it does carry is already reported for every operation by GET /console/v1/companies/{companyId}/activity, so hiding this list would be a rule with no content. Revoked and expired credentials stay in it.

GET
/console/v1/companies/{companyId}/credentials

Any member may read it, VIEWER included. It carries no secret -- there is no column holding one -- and the public prefix it does carry is already reported for every operation by GET /console/v1/companies/{companyId}/activity, so hiding this list would be a rule with no content. Revoked and expired credentials stay in it.

Authorization

consoleSession
__Host-apf_console<token>

Set by POST /console/v1/sessions. HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict, Path=/, __Host- prefixed. It is never readable by JavaScript and there is no header alternative: accepting both carriers would let an attacker choose the weaker one.

In: cookie

Path Parameters

companyId*string
Formatuuid

Response Body

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

application/json

curl -X GET "https://example.com/console/v1/companies/497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08/credentials" \  -H "Authorization: Bearer apf_v2_tu_credencial"
{  "schemaVersion": "console.1",  "requestId": "d385ab22-0f51-4b97-9ecd-b8ff3fd4fcb6",  "companyId": "8bb73d03-06b4-47c7-80c7-59301f770eda",  "credentials": [    {      "credentialId": "f568fec0-10b6-4b94-9daf-e62c50c9bf3e",      "name": "string",      "tokenPrefix": "string",      "scopes": [        "string"      ],      "status": "ACTIVE",      "expiresAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",      "revokedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",      "lastUsedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",      "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"    }  ]}

Stream one artifact GET GET

The bytes come from apps/artifact-worker, which re-verifies the SHA-256 and the byte size of what it reads before any of it reaches the caller. The object key never leaves the server. Use versions/{representationId} as the kind to fetch a specific PDF render.

Mint an API credential POST POST

DEVELOPER and above, which is what ADR 0016 point 7 assigns to that role. The credential can issue comprobantes, so this is the privilege escalation the ADR names and does not pretend otherwise about: the mitigation is that it is recorded. The credential row and its ops.audit_events row are written in one transaction by the SAME function the provisioning API calls, and a DEFERRABLE constraint trigger on auth.api_credentials refuses at COMMIT to admit a credential for an organization-owned company without one -- so an unaudited mint is not a policy violation, it is a failed transaction. THE TOKEN IS IN THE 201 AND NOWHERE ELSE. A scope the caller's own role could not exercise is refused with 403 SCOPE_NOT_GRANTABLE rather than silently dropped.